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JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction of this matter. 
Neither party has any agrument on this point. 
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
Neither party has any question on this point. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW ON APPEAL 
AND BEING DISCUSSED IN THIS REPLY BRIEF 
(a) The lower court did err in determining that the 
Defendant Fleischmann gained nothing by Sheriff s sale on property 
claimed to be owned by the Plaintiffs. 
(b) Rimaras, Inc. s interest in the property terminated 
by the Sheriff s sale when it failed to redeem. 
(c) Hall and Rigby never had any interest in the 
property. 
STATUTES, ORDINANCES AND RULES 
1. Title 78-22-1: 
"Lien of judgment — From the time the judgment 
of the District Court or Circuit Court is docketed 
and filed in the office of the Clerk of the District 
Court of the County it becomes a lien upon all the 
real property of the judgment debtor, not exempt 
from execution, in the County in which the judgment 
is entered, owned by him at the time or by him 
thereafter acquired during the existence of said 
lien.n 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
As to the statement of the case, the Appellant acknowledges 
that the claim became operative when filed in Garfield County, Utah, 
on the 8th day of July, 1985. She alleges further that property 
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taxes were paid by the Respondents but were paid tor less than the 
seven-year period being paid in the spring ol 1986 for the previous 
five years, then missing 1986, and paying the taxes in the fall ot 
1987 for only the 1987 taxes. The 1986 taxes were actually paid 
by the Appellant during the course of this action. In addition, 
Defendant Rigby liled an answer pro se, he was never given notice 
of trial setting and he did not participate. He still has rights. 
The Attorney who had represented Defendant Hall in some phases of 
the matter was present in the courtroom at the time ol trial. The 
claim that Defendants Hall and Rimaras, Inc. did not participate 
is made in that they claim nothing in the property and because 
that was the only item that was being tried. Judge Tibbs called 
counselsf attention to the fact that the interest of Rimaras, Inc. 
was terminated at the time of the Sheriff s sale, transcript, Page 
45, Lines 15 and 16. 
STATEMENT Ol FACTS 
1. Pertaining to the statement oi facts contained in 
Respondents * Brief, there is some argument since paragraph 2 
thereof is substantially correct with the exception that the 
document was not recorded with the bariield County Recorder unless 
it has been recorded entirely alter the trial, and that is in 
error. Pertaining to any exchange ol property, the only evidence 
of that was PlaintiffsT testimony, there is nothing in writing and 
nothing has been recorded. There has not been any recording oi 
this transaction regardless ot paragraph 2 ot the statement of 
facts in Respondents Brief. In addition, Respondents1 Brier. 
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In addition, Respondents thought they were dealing with Defendants 
Hall and Rigby on a personal basis; they were not aware that the 
Defendants Hall and Rigby did not own the property. (Transcript, 
Page 15, Lines 31 to 36.) 
2. Pertaining to paragraph 3 of the statement of tacts 
of Respondents1 Brief, the monetary transactions which caused them 
to turn to Miss Fleischmann was an agreement that if these items 
were paid, the lien would be released. The Respondents had full 
knowledge of this and had knowledge of this prior to the Sherifl's 
sale. They had knowledge that Rimaras, Inc. was the record holder 
of the property. Respondents did nothing about it. (Exhibits 4 
and 15.) 
3. Respondents1 statement of facts, paragraph 4, is 
accurate as far as the Appellant has knowledge. Further, the 
Findings of Fact claim the deedsreferred to as Exhibit 3 were 
personal deeds from Hall and Rigby and that they never owned an 
interest in the property at any time whatsoever. And at the 
time the same was claimed to have been executed, the 20th day 
of January, 1981, the deed to Rimaras, inc. had not been 
recorded and had not been delivered as the title to the property 
was in the name of a lady by the name of Stella Warwick formerly 
known as Stella Allen. The deed given to Rimaras, Inc. was not 
recorded until after the issuance and qualilication ot Exhibit 2. 
This is purported to be a deed from Rigby and Hall and qualified 
by the letter, Exhibit 2. 
4. Pertaining to paragraph 5 ot Respondents' statement 
of facts, there is a very interesting item there pertaining to 
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Exhibit 4. This does not tell the whole story as of the date of 
Exhibit 4, to-wit: The approximate date ot the 5th day of November, 
1987, which was never acknowledged and was qualified by a letter 
of the 4th day of November, 3 987, from Floyd J. Higby to Robert 
Garland which is Exhibit 15, and it states that it will be delivered 
in the future when certain conditions have been met. While stress 
is made on the fact that Rimaras, Inc. did not object, the default 
at the time of the trial, in paragraph 5 of Respondents statement 
of facts, one must remember that Rimaras, Ine.'s interest had been 
sold to Appellant in excess ot six months before the trial date in 
a Sheriff's sale and a Sherifffs Deed had been issued. Under those 
conditions, there was no point for Rimaras, Inc. to be concerned as 
it had nothing left in the property at that time. One very interest-
ing item in paragraph 5 of Respondents' statement of facts in 
Respondents1 Brief, is, nRimaras Inc. issued a deed to Plaintiffs 
on the 20th day of October, 1988 which was recorded on the 31st 
day of October, 1989." One presumes it was recorded in October, 
1988. This was after Judge Tibbs had decided the case on the 6th 
day of October, 1988. One must wonder why the Respondents are 
not relying upon Judge Tibbsf decision and is still attempting 
to get a deed from Rimaras, Inc. when they did not do so before 
the trial. Of course, Rimaras, Inc.?s interest had already been 
turned to Appellant Miss Fleischmann by the Sheriff's Deed prior 
thereto. The so-called deed from Rimaras, Inc. to the Respondents 
of the 20th day of October, 1988 is a nullity. One cannot help 
but wonder what is the purpose of bringing it up as a new item in 
an appeal at this point, and one cannot help but wonder if 
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Respondents thought it was necessary to obtain the same. 
5. Pertaining to paragraphs 6 and 7 of the statement of 
facts of Respondentsr Brief, Exhibit 5 is again erroneously denom-
inated. Exhibit 5 is the receipt for the payment of the 1987 
taxes. (Transcript page 39, line 24; page 41, line 3.) This shows 
the testimony of the Garfield County Treasurer, Mrs. Henrie, as to 
the payment of taxes on this particular property that were material 
in this case. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT ON APPEAL 
POINT I: Rimaras, Inc. owned Lot #128 in July, 1985, 
when AppellantTs lien was fixed on Lot #128. 
POINT II: Rimaras, Inc. owned the property until the 
SheriffTs Sale and the issuance of a Sherifffs Deed in 1988. 
ARGUMENT ON APPEAL 
POINT I 
RIMARAS, INC. OWNED LOT #128 IN JULY, 1985, WHEN 
APPELLANT'S LIEN WAS FIXED ON LOT #128. 
Regardless of the cases that cite the date of recording, 
for there to be a transfer, there has to be some sort of a conveyance 
of some interest in the property by the property owner to which the 
transfer is being made to. This is not in existence in this case. 
It is the basis of Kartchner v. State Tax Commission and Wyatt, 4 
Utah 2d 382, 294 P.2d 790, (1956), and the cases that follow that 
line of thought. While there is no question that recording gives 
notice to other people as to pertaining to the parties of any trans-
action, there has to be some sort of a transaction before there can 
be a transfer; this we do not have in this particular instance. 
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There is no question that Mr. Garland was dealing with Mr. Hall 
and Mr. Ki gby on an item in Exhibit 1 which is the only thing 
that was in existence prior to judgment date, the? 6th day of 
October, 1988, that said he had an interest in any property. This 
is not the property listed as Lot #128, but is Lot #126. The 
unsupported testimony of Mr. Garland is to the el feet that at 
some time thereafter, his wife decided otherwise and they traded 
Lot #126 for Lot #128. They did not in anyway have a written item. 
One further affirms that Higby and Hall are real estate specialists. 
Certainly had they intended to make any trade whatsoever, they 
would have done so in writing. Aiso is this true when one reviews 
the titles of the property and it has never been in their names. 
(Transcript, page 33, line 16 to page 38, line 18) This is the 
testimony of Thomas V. Hatch, a qualified title insurance man. 
In said testimony, Exhibit 11 is identified as an abstract of title 
on the property during the critical period. Exhibit 10 is also 
identified as the SheriffTs Deed to Miss Fleischmann. Exhibit 11 
shows interest in Rimaras, Inc., the entity not involved in the 
lawsuit, dated about the 1st day of January, 1980, and recorded 
approximately one year later. At no time does the name Hall or 
the name of Rigby show to have any interest in the property. The 
abstract then shows the lien by virtue of the judgment filing in 
July, 1985, by which the lien of the AppelLant was perfected. 
The abstract further shows the Sherifffs sale and the Sherifffs 
deed. Until after the trial, there is nothing from Rimaras, Inc. 
to anybody except to Miss Eleischmann of any interest on this 
property. 
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If one looks at Exhibit 1 pertaining to other property, 
takes Mr. Garland's testimony, it shows that Mr. Garland, Mr. Hall 
and Mr. Rigby decided to change it as well as Exhibits 2 and 3. 
The deed from Hall and Rigby to Garland dated January 20, 1981 
was on property that they did not own, together with a letter 
from Hall to Mr. Garland indicating that in the future the original 
would be sent to him. This did nothing to in anyway obligate 
Rimaras, Inc. Under the circumstances, there can be no question 
but that in July, 1985, when Miss FleischmannTs judgment against 
Rimaras, Inc. was filed in the office of the Garfield County Clerk, 
it became a lien against whatever property there was belonging to 
Rimaras, Inc. in Garfield County, Utah. This piece of real property 
did belong to Rimaras, Inc. at that time as a deed had been recorded 
in 1981, showing it belonging to Rimaras, Inc. and nothing had 
been done since that time, recorded or otherwise that in anyway 
transfered the interest of Rimaras, Inc. Regardless of what we 
say, personal transactions of Hall and Rigby are not the trans-
actions of Rimaras, Inc., a corporation. They are not represented 
to be at any point in the action. Under these conditions, at the 
time of filing of the transcript of judgment in Garfield County, 
Utah, in July, 1985, the judgment lien affixed on this property, 
and any other real property belonging to Rimaras, Inc. in Garfield 
County, Utah. 
The Respondents have gone to great lengths to tell us 
about the effect of various recording statutes and items of that 
nature. However, they have absolutely no bearing in this matter 
because until the Respondents can show some place that they obtained 
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from Rimaras, Inc. the interest or Rimaras, inc. in the property, 
the interest ol Rimaras, Inc. in that property continues to exist 
until it is some place extinguished as it was by the Sherirl's 
sale in 1988. .from the time ol 1985 to 1988, it was subject to 
the lien of Miss lleisehmann, the Appellant. 
One cannot help but wonder ii all is welL with the argu-
ment ot the Respondents when the Respondents went to the time and 
expense ot securing trom Rimaras, Inc. a deed to the Respondents 
on the 20th day ol October, 1988, and recording the same on the 
31st day of October, 1988. Both of these dates were after the 
trial date. Contrary to the opinion set forth by the Respondents, 
this is not a recording question. This is a question ot conveyance 
ol the interest of Rimaras, Inc. 11 said interest has been 
conveyed at all, it was done after the trial. At that time, the 
interest of the Appellant was without impairment and said interest 
was subject to Appellant s lien and was only conveyed by the 
Sheriff s sale m 1988. 
Under these conditions, taking Mr. Garland's testimony, 
at best he is what we used to call a nsquattern and paid taxes 
tor 1981, 1982, 1983, 1984, 1985, and 1987. He missed paying 
taxes on the property in 1986. Apparently, Respondents do not 
ieel that they had sutficient color of title to justity holding 
the property in connection with this matter inasmuch as they entirely 
failed to gi\e any eftect whatsoever in this action to Chapter 6 
of Title 57, Utah Code Annotated, (1953 as amended) pertaining to 
occupying claimants. Had they had any color of title whatsoever, 
the Respondents might still be looking at that chapter. Respondents 
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have no color of title whatsoever that is within the realm 01 this 
Court at this time. We must come to the conclusion that as of 
July, 3985, the judgment lien of Miss Fleischmann takes the entire 
interest of the property in question as it was the property of 
Rimaras, Inc. at that time. Rimaras, Inc. had done nothing to 
change the title of this property from its name. There is no 
question that based upon Exhibits 4 and 15, as of November, 1987, 
the Respondents acquired actual knowledge of the judgment lien of 
Miss lleischmann, and that Rigby made arrangements claiming certain 
monies were due to obtain a release ot the lien from Miss 
fleischmann by virtue of the payment of certain monies which 
they did not pay. (Exhibits 4 and 15.) This brings us to the 
conclusion that the judgment lien of Miss lleischmann in July, 
1985, became a lien against this particular property as it was then 
the property of Rimaras, Inc. 
POINT II 
RIMARAS, INC. OWNED THE PROPERTY UNTIL THE SHERIFF'S 
SALE AND THE ISSUANCE OF A SHERIFF'S DEED IN 1988. 
The lien having affixed on the property, the question came 
as to whether or not there was anything to sell in 1988. There 
still was no evidence of Rimaras, Inc. to convey to anybody Lot 
#128, of which we still do not have any information whatsoever. The 
only item that has been done that aftected Lot #128 as lar as Rimaras, 
Inc.fs interest is concerned was the filing o± the judgment lien of 
Miss Fleischmann in 1985. Under these conditions, Mr. Garland refused 
to make the cash payments that had been arranged for him by Mr. 
Rigby in November, 1987, theretore, the Appellant saw fit to go 
forward with the Sheriff's sale. And this is the result. Mr. 
-12-
Garland indicated that he had nothing from Rimaras, Inc. that said 
he had any interest in the property. (Transcript, Page 26, line 20 
to line 22.) Under these conditions, until he can produce something 
from Rimaras, Inc. that says that he has an interest in the property, 
then he has no interest in the property. He obtained a deed after 
the trial as is set forth in paragraph 5 of the Statement of Facts 
of Respondents' Brief. Respondents are still acknowledging that 
they are still trying to get title from Rimaras, inc. Keep in 
mind that Respondentsf counsel was at the Sheriff's sale. Apparently, 
the relations at the time of trial were where deeds could be obtained, 
and one cannot help but wonder why the Respondents did not make a 
redemption between the time of the Sheriff s sale and the issuance 
of the Sheriff's deed. 
However, a great deal is made by the Respondents of the 
fact that Rimaras, Inc. did not appear at the time of trial. There 
was no question that prior to the time of trial, the Sheriff's deed 
had been issued as it had been issued in July, 1988. The trial date 
was the 6th day of October, 1988. One cannot help but wonder what 
is the purpose of the Respondents obtaining a deed from Rimaras, 
Inc. on the 20th day of October, 1988, and what can it convey with 
a Sheriff's deed being in existence and recorded in July, 1988. 
Under these conditions, we conclude that the Sheriff's deed and 
the sale transferred to Miss Fleischmann the title of the property, 
and that the title of the property was in Rimaras, Inc. until 
the judgment sale. The Respondents Garland had no interest whatso-
ever in Lot #128 except that ot a "Squatter." 
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CONCLUSION ON APPEAL 
Therefore, Appellant comes to the conclusion that there 
has never been a document whatsoever or any sort of a transaction 
whatsoever involving Rimaras, Inc. to Respondents Garland. The 
Respondents have admitted that he has nothing from Rimaras, Inc. 
that in anyway conveys to them that gives them any interest in 
the property whatsoever, and that their entire transaction was 
with Hall and Rigby. There is no showing whatsoever that they 
have ever owned any interest in the property. 
Under these conditions, the decision of the Garfield 
District Court should be reversed. Lot #128 should be awarded 
to Miss Fleischmann together with her costs and expenses in 
connection with this appellate procedure. 
DATED this /j day of March, 1989. 
Respectfully submitted, 
C. k /v 
PATRICK H. FENTON 
Attorney for Appellant 
Miss Anna R. Fleischmann 
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ADDENDUM 
15 
November 4, 1987 
Mr. Robert Garland 
i5t>0 Palamino 
Henderson, Nevada 89C]S 
Dear Mr. Garland. 
With regard to the outstanding bill you yet owe for the construction 
of your log homo on Lot #128, Tommy Creek Subdivision, I am enclosing 
the following it- mized accounting: 
Beginning 
Interest 
Interest 
Interest 
Interest 
Interest 
Interest 
Interest i 
Balance 
r.48 per 
August, 
August, 
August, 
August, 
August. 
August. 
August, 
day from 
1981 
1982 99, 
1983 109. 
1984 119. 
1985 131. 
1986 145. 
1987 159, 
August 1. 
.09 
.00 
.90 
.89 
.08 
.59 
198 
990.93 
1,090.02 
1.199.02 
1.318.92 
1.450.81 
1,595.89 
1.755.48 
7)' 
1 have prepared a Warranty Deed which T have signed and notorized to 
you fcr Lot #128, Tommy Creek Subdivision and will place it with 
Security Title Company. 
With regard to the Judgement which is currently against the property, 
T have contacted Mr. Patrick Fenton. Attorney for the Fleischmanns. 
He has instructed me to have the funds placed in escrow with the 
Title Company after which He will make the necessary provissions to 
release the lien. He will make no such provissions until the $1,755.48 
plus the daily accruing interest is in the escrow account. 
I will deliver the Deed to Security Title Company on November 5, 1987. 
pc. Mr. Patrick Fenton, Attorney 
Security Title Compjnv 
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